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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS
PsYcHiATRisTs and psychologists have recently evinced concern over
the legal implications of psychological research with human subjects.'
Their concern is understandable, especially as it pertains to liability for
damages, for the environment in which such human experimentation is
pursued may be aptly termed extralegal in that legal bounds have not
been delineated by judicial or legislative pronouncements.' To a dis-
2AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS 113-24
(1953); Berg, The Use of Human Subjects in Psychological Research, 9 Am. PSYCHOL.
log (1954) i Rogers, Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question, io AM. PSYCHOL.
267 (x955); Rogers, Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior, ad-
dress to American Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Aug. 1956; Bressler, Silver-
man, Cohen & Shmavonian, Research in Human Subjects and the Artificial Traumatic
Neurosis: Where Does Our Responsibility Lie?, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 522 (1959).
Current psychological research projects concerned with isolation and sensory depriva-
tion, and involving the experimental manipulation of fundamental aspects of the mental,
functioning of particular human beings, have emphasized the need to clarify the legal-
environment of psychological research with human subjects.
The Bio-Sciences Information Exchange, a clearinghouse for current research in the
biological, medical, and psychological sciences which serves both government and lion-
government fund-granting agencies and investigators associated with recognized re-
search institutions, has on file thirteen active notices of research projects submitted by'
psychiatrists and psychologists engaged in such studies.
Although these research projects differ in design and methodology and often employ
varying techniques, either because of variations in their primary focus of interest or
different theoretic frames of reference, their general purpose is the study of disruptive
psycologic effects of environments which are void of direct human contact and which
have an altered sensory input both as to pattern and quantity of stimuli.
The following statement is illustrative of the procedure followed in these .experi-
ments: "[The subjects] were then confined in a dark, light-proof, soundproof, cubicle-
like room (4 x 9 x 8 ft.) which contained only a bed. They wore gloves to which
circular cardboard tubes were attached. These tubes extended from below the elbow to
beyond the fingertips. Ear-plugs were used to reduce detection of noise of the Ss' own
making. They were instructed to remain as quiet as possible since the intent was to
reduce all sensory stimulation to as low a level as possible-hence the use of the some-
what inaccurate term 'sensory deprivation.'" Vernon & McGill, The Effect of Sensory
Deprivation upon Rote Learning, 70 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 637 (957).
SCReported cases have not yet considered modern controlled medical research, and
have not yet established limits within which human research may be pursued." Ladimer,
Legal and Ethical Implications of Medical Research on Human Beings 170 (958)
(unpublished thesis in The George Washington Law School Library) [hereinafter cited
as Ladimer]. Irving Ladimer, S.J.D., former Assistant Chief, Office of Research
Planning, National Institutes of Health, United States Public Health Service, recently
served as Conference Secretary and Medico-Legal Consultant to the National Conference
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cipline which has experimented with human beings since first assuming
a scientific posture,8 the situation is indeed anomalous. The irony of
this situation lies in the fact that in recent years it has been the federal
government which has generously supported psychological research,
both within its own laboratories and by contract and grant to colleges,
study centers, and other institutions.4
That the problem of the proper conduct of psychological research
has not been directly raised in a judicial forum may be explained by the
fact that such research has seldom heretofore involved potential harm
to the subject.5 However, when an investigation involves the experiJ
on the Legal Environment of Medical Science, University of Chicago.
"[W]hile human experimentation has accompanied the practice of medicine from
times of antiquity, the current concept of medical research has not really been presented
as such to the courts. As the courts have understood it, human experimentation has not
been, nor is it now, legally recognized as a legitimate part of the physician's activities.
. . . The universal and long-standing recognition that research is essential to the ad-
vancement of medical. science and the newer recognition that some aspects of basic
science cannot advance without it have led to a correct, although still extralegal, ex-
panision of human experimentation. Curiously, such work, when well conceived and
soundly conducted, is everywhere recognized as being properly within the ethical and
moral concepts of our timei yet it remains outside legally. Legal inclusion will depend
on an understanding of all the facets of the problem." Beecher, Experimentation i9
Man, 169 A.M.A.J. 461 (.959).
"No reported court decision has considered research specifically in terms of the right
and liability of a trained professional to.use a living patient or a normal subject as a
means of discovering new knowledge not necessarily of direct benefit to that patient or
subject. None of the cases that have actually come before the appellate courts have.
involved a real scientist observing the proper precautions and giving primary considera-
tion to the welfare of his patient." Sessoms, Guiding Principles in Medical Research
Involving Humans, 3z A. HosP. ASS'N J. 44, 6o (1958).
Ladimer, at 8.
'Ibid., citing Young & Wilson, Gov.ernnent Support of Extramural Psychological
Research: Fiscal Year x956, ii AM. PSYCHOL. 630 (i956), in which some idea is given
of the magnitude of federally supported psychological research, most of which involves
experimentation with human subjects: "In fiscal year x956 (ending June 30, 1956)
approximately 10.5 million dollars were obligated by some twenty departments and
subdivisions of the Federal Government for the conduct of research in psychology and
dosely related areas. . . . This total continues the trend toward regaining the high
postwar level reached in fiscal 1953 (approximately xx million dollars)."
'It has been proposed, however, that future experimentation be "far more realistic
than it has been in the past," although the proponent is undecided as to how far bne can
go in a no-holds-barred type of research with human subjects. Letter From John C.
Lilly, M.D., Executive Director, Communication Research Institute, U.S. Virgin Islands,
to the Duke Law Journal, July 7, 1959, on file in Duke University Law Library. Dr.
Lilly provocatively adds: "Even on a purely medical side it might pay tremendously to
do courageous experiments pushing the boundaries on the moral and ethical things back
a little more than they are at the present time. ... Many diseases have their origin in
stressful situations. Especially in the psychological sphere. At least this is the present
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mental manipulation of fundamental aspects of mental functioning of a
particular human being,' and thus creates the potential for serious injury,
the possibility of the subject's seeking judicial redress for his injury is
not-so remote that speculative consideration of related legal problems is
unwarranted.
If a legal action is brought against the scientific experimenter, its
result will depend upon the existence of a privilege conferred on the
experimenter by society, determined by balancing the risk of possible
harm to the subject against the potential returns to society,7 and upon
the legal efficacy of the subject's consent, the appraisal of which would
be difficult due to circumstances of psychological research which may
often preclude apprising him sufficiently of the possible risk of harm.
theory. Experimental verification of such matters awaits courageous scientific work
which is yet to be done."
* As in conceivable isolation and sensory deprivation studies.
"In a letter to the Duke Law Journal, dated May 27, 1959, on file in the Duk4
University Law Library, George E. Ruff, Capt., USAF(MC), Chief, Stress & Fatigue
Section, Aero Medical Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, states: "It
seems apparent that reasons for justifying isolation research must become stronger as risks
increase. We feel that the limited possibilities of danger in our work are more than
outweighed by its potential returns. Both the need for data on personality structure
and function and on environments important in space flight are more than enough to
justify these particular experiments. Such reasons would probably not justify studies
where a high percentage of the subjects might be harmed."
' The subject's having sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision "is often quite impossible ... for the complexities of essential medical research
have reached the point where the full implications and possible hazards cannot always
be known to anyone and are often communicable only to a few informed investigators
and sometimes not even to them. Certainly the full implications of work to be done
are often not really communicable to lay subjects." Beecher, supra note 2, at 473.
Sufficient knowledge and comprehension on the part of the subject to enable him to
make an enlightened decision are all the more difficult to achieve in the conduct of
psychological research because: (x) Animal experimentation is only of limited usefulness
in interpreting emotional and behavioral states. Ladimer, at 89. In fact, investigations
of complex psychologic reactions, which are either lacking or not comprehensible in ani-
mals, require active initial participation by human subjects. Shimkin, The Problem of
Experimentation on Human Beings: The Research Worker's Point of View, 117 SCIENCE
205, 207 (1953). (2) Pre-experimental instructions and information made available
to the subject may be extremely important determinants of ultimate response. Ruff,
Levy & Thaler, Some Influences on Reaction to Reduced Sensory -Input, Aero Medical
Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (unpublished manuscript on file in
the Duke University Law Library); Cohen, Silverman, Bressler & Shmavonian, Prac-
tical and Theoretic Difficulties in "Isolation" Studies, Psychophysiologic Laboratory,
Duke University Medical Center (unpublished manuscript on file in the Duke Univer-
sity Law Library). Capt. George E. Ruff states in his letter, supra note 7, that:
"Because the removal of external structuring increases the importance of subtle cues to
the subject, I feel that it is impossible to discuss with the subject either the risks or any
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Further, if liability exists, the subject's recovery of damages will be
affected both by the elements of loss or types of harm deemed com-
pensable and by the measurement of these elements of loss. Deter-
mining the elements or the types of harm is complicated by the fact
that harms of varying degrees of tangibility may result from the internal
operation of psychic stimuli.9 The measurement of these elements of
harm will also be difficult of solution due to the problem of assigning
value to altered psychological functioning. The solution of this latter
problem will be facilitated, however, by knowledge of the subject's
pre-existing personality make-up, of the force and character of the stimu-
lus, and of the subject's susceptibility to the stimulus."0
LIABILITY"
Legally, it is difficult to regard psychological experimentation as
other than an intentional invasion of the subject's interest in peace of
mind, an interest entitled to independent legal protection in the absence
of a privilege conferred by society and the subject's consent.
When is an experimenter privileged? Conceptually, privilege cre-
ates an immunity which prevents the very existence of the tort. It
signifies that the defendant has acted to further an interest of such social
importance that he is entitled to protection from liability for the in-
other features of the experiment before it begins. Responsibility for whatever happens
clearly rests upon the shoulders of the experimenter, so that one should use considerable
discretion in choice of subjects and procedures for this kind of research." (3) Results
of isolation experiments depend on the manipulation of experimental variables, and such
experiments thus involve varying degrees of risk. On this point Capt. Ruff states: "In
our studies ...factors which are threatening to the subject are minimized. Since we
do not feel that isolation is dangerous per se, chances of harm to the subject are low
in our situation. On the other hand, by maximizing the conditions which produce
anxiety, such experiments would have drastically different effects." (4) The implica-
tions of altered psychologic functioning may not be so appreciated by subjects of psy-
chological experimentation as would the consequences which could result, for example,
from participation in "live" polio vaccine experiments.
' There have been experiments in which a temporary abrogation of usual ego func-
tioning has been introduced, producing in the subject what has been termed a temporary
artificial traumatic neurosis which would not have emerged with the same intensity in
ordinary circumstances. See Bressler, Silverman, Cohen & Shmavonian, supra note i, at
525.
"See Ruff, Levy & Thaler, supra note 8, at 5-1o; Cohen, Silverman, Bressler &
Shmavonian, supra note 8, at 4-23.
"Although the experimenter-subject relationship may be viewed as contractual,
each party agreeing to perform in accordance with prearranged terms and obligations,
implied and expressed, the question of liability is fundamentally a tort problem. The
criminal responsibility of the experimenter is considered in Smith, Antecedent Grounds of




jurious consequences of his act. His action is privileged because the
public interest warrants it, and social policy will best be served by per-
mitting it. Thus, the limits of the privilege are defined by current. ideas
of what will most effectively promote the public welfare.
Fundamental to the question of liability, then, is whether the re-
search program and the experimentation encompassed therein are of
such paramount public concern that a privilege should be conferred upon
the investigator. Legal acceptance of such a public policy would appear
to depend upon the extent of its embodiment in law.12  Of this it has
been said :13
Certain it is that the performance of an experiment involving serious conse-
quences would have to be specifically, not generally, acceptable under law or
associated with some public emergency or necessity . . .or military require-
ment. There is no assurance, otherwise, that an agreement for voluntary
participation, even with full knowledge, will insure non-liability.
Still, the disposition of the liability question can hardly rest on a
privilege founded only on extrinsic policy factors, for nonconsensual
privilege cannot extend to a situation in which, as here, the relationship
is one of free association.
What is "legally sufficient" consent? Because consent of the injured
party will ordinarily avoid liability for intentional interference with his
interests, the nature of the consent which will have this insulating effect
requires careful consideration.
A recent article' 4 on liability for medical experimentation contends
that express consent to experimentation should bar tort recovery, citing
as authority an early Illinois decision' 5 which held that, in order to con-
stitute an effective defense, consent must be based on' full disclosure of
both the novelty of the procedure and the possible hazards involved.
It has also been suggested that, where no social or scientific interest is
involved, the requisite disclosure should be full and explicit, including
the "impropriety of the experiment .. . to make the subject's consent
enlightened submission."' 6
Assuming that the subject thoroughly understands the hazards in-
volved in the experiment and that there is no unequal bargaining, a
research contract involving scientifically and morally acceptable research
" Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24 COLUM.
L. REv. 8i9 (1924).
" Ladmer, at 157. "Note, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 159 (952).
"5 Graham v. Doctor Pratt Inst., 163 Ill. App. 91 (i9ii)-
"o Smith, supra note ix, at 287.
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can stand against intentional interest-invasion. The practice followed
by recognized research institutions, requiring a signed and witnessed
agreement setting forth the aims, procedures, and possible risks involved
in the research, seems to be the safest assurance and evidence of formal
understanding following verbal explanation and questioning. 18
The sufficiency of this agreement will depend upon the extent of
subject enlightenment which is feasible under the circumstances of the
experiment.' 9 In psychological research, pre-experimental instruction
of the subject is often necessarily restricted because to inform the sub-
ject fully of the nature and purpose of the experiment may produce in
him the unwanted variable of suggestibility and thereby impair the
validity of the experiment's results. Moreover, subject enlightenment
may be impossible where the subject does not truly understand the
implications of altered psychologic functioning or otherwise fails to
appreciate the risks to which he will be subjected. In these circumstances
in which the consent of the subject may lack legal sufficiency, the experi-
menter thus chooses between jeopardizing the validity of his research
and subjecting himself to liability for injuries to the subject.
Consent of the nature involved in the physician-patient relationship
would seem to be dearly inadequate, because it is often inferred from
the fact that the physician's efforts are directed to the maintenance of
the patient's health for his benefit.20 In the experimenter-subject rela-
tionship, however, implied consent lacks legal sufficiency because the
subject is not seeking the benefit of the experimenter's skills; in fact, he
has little to gain from the relationship.
The preceding discussion has considered the possibility that litiga-
tion arising out of psychological experimentation may determine it to be
an intentional invasion of interest. Allegations of negligence, or reck-
lessness, for which the general rules of malpractice would be applicable, 2'
are conceivable as well.
Clearly, malpractice applies to the research scientist who fails to
meet the controlling standards or guides governing the profession of
scientific investigation.22 These standards or guides may appear subtle
" Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3 J.
PUB. L. 467, 508 (.95,0.
" Research principles which guide the clinical research program at the Clinical
Center of the National Institutes of Health are presented in an examination of some of
the legal and moral aspects of drug research in Sessoms, supra note 2.
19 See note 8 supra.
-o Ladimer, at 545 Ladimer, supra note 17, at 485, 503-04.
-Ladimer, supra note 17, at 503. 221d. at 486.
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and elusive since the essence of research is novel and untried activity, 3
but the means by which research is planned or undertaken and the safe-
guards employed are essentially analogous to those which guide the
general practitioner.
These standards and guides may be derived from at least three
sources :24
(i) formal and informal codes or guides of conduct suggested for
application in the field of study and practice 25
(2) actual procedures employed by institutions and scientists of
standing and repute 26 and
(3) applicable statutes and regulations.2
To the extent such standards and guides are available, some basis for
determining proper legal action in each fact situation would exist.
Is assumption of risk a tenable defense? There are at least two
different concepts of voluntary assumption of risk, involving different
policies and different conditions for their application." In its primary
sense the plaintiff's assumption of risk is only the counterpart of the
defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk. The de-
fendant is not negligent because he creates a risk only to those who know
about and desire to encounter the risk, and he is justified in reasonably
thinking that no one will be subjected to the risk he creates unless the
person wants to be. To the extent the experimenter-subject relationship
is one of free association, then, the application of assumption of risk in
this primary sense should relieve the experimenter of liability unless his
belief that the subject knew about and desired the risk was an unreason-
able one, or unless the experimenter's conduct creates a risk of such
magnitude that liability should be imposed simply as a matter of public
policy.
When plaintiff may be said to have assumed the risk created by
23 Ib;d. 2' Ibid.
2 E.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, op. cit. supra note x, even sets forth
the ten principles for establishing general rules of conduct in developing research pro-
grams as formulated in 1949 in the judgment of the Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. io, 2 The Medical Case
181 (1949).
28 See note iS supra.
"
TThe opinion of the Attorney General of the State of New York, that there is no
provision of law that would permit any form of research to be performed upon a patient
confined in a state institution is one example. Ladimer, at 9o n.i8. Rules governing
the conduct of research in New York City hospitals are another example. Beecher,
supra note 2, at 466 n.23.
" HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 21.1 (5956).
Vol. z96o: z651
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defendant's breach of duty by knowingly encountering that risk without
justification, then assumption of risk in this secondary sense (analy-
tically, advertent contributory negligence) is an appropriate defense.
However, is it a tenable one in this situation? Although the subject
may have known what the experimenter intended to do and may have
been willing to have this done to him, still, the subject may not have
fully realized the risks involved. Mere knowledge of the facts which
create the risk of harm is not enough unless there is a true appreciation
of the nature and extent of the risk; 29 only then is the subject's assent
given under circumstances which make it legally effective. The im-
portant point here, however, is that, in ascertaining whether the subject
truly appreciated the risk of harm involved, it is inevitable that con-
siderations of policy, depending on the result desired, will consciously
or unconsciously influence the court's decision.
Further, and in contrast, where assumption of the risk in its second-
ary sense bars the subject from recovery because he acted unreasonably
in encountering the risk under the circumstances, the court has the oppor-
tunity to consider policy factors in applying the standard of reasonable-
ness to the particular facts.
Finally, when the subject is harmed because the experimenter negli-
gently created a risk different from the one to which the subject assented,
or is harmed by a risk the probability of occurrence of which was greatly
increased by the experimenter's negligence, then the experimenter should
be held liable where the magnitude of the resulting risk is dispropor-
tionate to the social utility of creating it.
Thus, tenability of assumption of risk in the secondary sense as a
defense to negligently conducted experimentation is ultimately de-
pendent upon policy considerations.
It would seem, then, in the light of this analysis of the question of
liability, that concern for the position of the nontherapy-oriented experi-
menter"0 and the research center, which is not at least a recognized
therapeutic adjunct of a medical care and observation center,81 is espe-
dally warranted.
DAMAGES
If it is assumed that the subject has established his right to have
reparation for his injury, the law of damages will have a bearing on
" If the subject acted unreasonably in failing to appreciate the nature and extent of
the risk, he ought to be barred by his inadvertent contributory negligence.
Bressler, Silverman, Cohen & Shmavonian, supra note i, at 526.
8 Ladimer, at 97.
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what types of harms are compensable.3 Writers who have considered
the problem generally conclude that the difficulties of proof which would
confront a court in a case involving both psychic injury and psychic
stimulus are not insurmountable.33 Despite the existence of the ele-
ments of liability, damages may be labelled "remote" and compensation
denied therefor as a result of restrictions which include the purely
arbitrary. 4 These restrictions have been outlined as difficulties of proof
and judicial aversion to making the load of liability inordinately heavy.35
With respect to the first restriction, difficulties of proof would not
be great in most cases of psychological experimentation, because evi-
dence of the subject's pre-existing personality make-up, the force of the
stimulus, and the susceptibility of the subject to the stimulus would
probably be available. 6 Thus, there would be a basis for comparing the
subject's condition before and after the experiment, thereby obviating
difficulties of proof present in the more common psychic injury-psychic
stimulus case. A more exact basis for determining the extent of the
injury is available.
Concerning judicial aversion to making the burden of liability too
great, policy considerations similar to those which determine the exist-
ence of privilege would be relied upon. For example, this may involve
an assessment of the possible deterrent effect of this additional cost
factor upon the availability of funds for needed research.
THE DILEMMA AND is REsOLUTION
Within an analytical framework such as this, then, the first human
experimentation case may be decided, and a hitherto unaccounted-for
element of the true cost of such experimentation distributed. Such an
extension of the law, however, will not resolve the dilemma of society's
needing research while at the same time requiring due legal protection
for both experimenter and subject.
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 252 (1944).
"Ibid.1 McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1 (1949); Smith, Medical Evidence in Industrial Injury Cases with Special
Reference to Neuropsyciiatric Claims, in Worknwn's Compensation Problems, i, 49
(167 U.S. DEP'T op LABOR BUL. 1953); Smith & Bradford, Medicolegal Aspects of
Craniocerebral Injuries, 3 J. PUB. L. 663 (1954.) Worden, Some Neglected Aspects of
Injury, Mental Anguish and the Concept of Psychic Damage, 3 J. PUB. L. 377 0954)
Report of the New York State Law Revision Commission, Study Relating to Injuries
Resulting from Fright or Shock, LEG. Doc. No. 65(E) 0936).
a, Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 3o VA. L. Rmr. 87, 102 (-943).
"Id. at 1o5.
's In his discussion of psychic injury and tort liability, McNiece states that recovery
depends on these three factors. See McNiece, supra note 33, at 74.
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The resolution of this dilemma can be premised upon the recogni-
tion that society is more than the ultimate beneficiary of research;
through governmental action, society is the initiator of most research. 7
This condition alone, it would seem, should justify the following:
(i) A policy of liability without fault should be evolved for harm
resulting from psychological experimentation.38
(2) Where the government undertakes or participates in the re-
search program, it should also assume the burden of making injured
subjects whole, through treatment and rehabilitation and by the pay-
ment of monetary compensation.
(3) The government should consider such an underwriting pro-
gram as would be required to assume costs to subjects taking part in
private research programs conducted under modern, controlled condi-
tions.39
Among the effects of such developments on the whole environment
of psychological experimentation would be compensation of the injured
subject without regard to the doubtful questions of liability and proof
of injury,40 thereby encouraging the participation of a sufficient number
of subjects of varying levels of personality integration.
Further, there would also be legal protection for the experimenter
who is part of an approved modern, controlled research program, thus
encouraging research conducted on high planes. On the other hand,
experimenters not of this class-those who are not associated with
approved modern, controlled research programs-would be strictly liable
for any harm which results from their inducing others to serve as sub-
jects of their "research." Admittedly, the effect may be to discourage
to some extent research which is not specifically socially sanctioned.
Finally, national research effort in this area would become more
ordered in the sense and to the extent that the essentiality of each re-
search program, as balanced against the program's total cost, would be
the basis for go-ahead decisions by agencies having in view the entire
research picture.
s See note 4 supra.
"Indeed, it is possible that a doctrine of liability without fault may be imposed,
on the theory of a social cost of medical research, resembling concepts supporting pro-
grams such as workman's compensation." Ladimer, at 153.
39 See note is supra.
"'Remaining, however, would be the determination of the amount of recovery to
be allowed, an admittedly difficult process in cases of altered psychologic functioning.
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